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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
AND 
NATURE OF CASE 
The Defendant-Appellant McNicol appeals from the 
verdict of guilty before a jury tried on the 5th day of January, 
1976, in the District Court of the Third Judicial District in 
and for Tooele County, State of Utah, the Honorable Gordon R. 
Hall presiding, whereafter he was sentenced to an indeterminate 
term as provided by law for the crime of second degree murder 
as charged* 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On appeal, Defendant seeks to have the verdict re-
versed and a new trial granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 23rd of July, 1975, at approximately 10:30 p.m. 
Defendant and deceased were in an apartment where they had been 
living in Pine Canyon, Tooele County, Utah (Exhibit 2). There 
is some indication that the individuals were arguing or quarrel-
ing (Exhibit 2, R. 64). Defendant put his arm around her neck 
from behind until she "passed out" (Exhibit 2) and then stretched 
her out on the floor. Some 30 minutes later he determined she was 
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dead and thereafter removed her clothes and placed her in the 
bed (R. 8). The following evening on the 24th of July, 1975, 
defendant went to the Police Station in Tooele, Utah, and re-
ported the occurrence to the Tooele County Sheriff. Thereafter, 
defendant was charged with the crime of criminal homicide, murder 
in the second degree, and Morris D. Young was appointed by the 
Court to defend him. 
POINT ON APPEAL 
REPRESENTATION BY APPOINTED COUNSEL WAS 
SO INEFFECTIVE AS NOT TO MEASURE UP TO 
THE REQUIRED STANDARD OF A COMPETENT MEM-
BER OF THE BAR RENDERING REASONABLY EF-
FECTIVE ASSISTANCE. 
A defendant is assured of the right to counsel by 
Section 12, Article 1 of the Utah Constitution and by the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
(Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335) and this requirement of as-
sistance of counsel is not satisfied by mere appearance of counsel, 
but requires as the test has been variously stated, "reasonably 
effective assistance" "no reasonably qualified attorney would have 
so acted" "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 
criminal cases" or "reasonably competent assistance of an attorney 
acting as the defendant's diligent, conscientious advocate" ... 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that "defense counselfs performance must be reasonably competent 
within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary 
training and skill in the criminal law." (The test of whether 
the representation of counsel was "so woefully inadequate as to 
make the trial a farce and a mockery of justice" standard has 
largely fallen into disrepute.) (Beesley v. U.S., 491 Fed. 2d. 
687, U.S. v. De Carter, 487 Fed. 1197.) 
This Court has apparently adopted the more modern test, 
and in the case of Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d, 118 (incidentally 
involving the same defense counsel involved in the instant case) 
at page 120 states: 
"The further question necessary to 
confront is this: is there a basis for 
believing that a better representation 
by counsel would have been of some advant-
age to petitioner?" 
and goes on to state that a case will not be reversed for mere 
error or irregularity but only where it is substantial and pre-
judicial "that is, not unless the error is of sufficient import-
ance that it might have had some effect upon the results". 
Further on page 121 in discussing the requirement for counsel 
this Court states: 
"The entitlement is to the assistance 
of a competent member of the bar,who shows 
a willingness to identify himself with the 
interests of the defendant and presents such 
defenses as are available to him under the 
law and consistent with the ethics of the 
profession." 
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In examining the record herein it is interesting 
to note that the entire transcript in this second degree murder 
trial is 74 pages long and that the entire trial was completed 
between 9:00 a.m. with the jury retiring at 4:45 p.m. and the 
returning of the verdict at 5:27 p.m. 
While different readers of this transcript might 
arrive at a different count, there are approximately 165 leading, 
and/or suggestive questions asked by the prosecutor on direct ex-
amination of the witnesses with only one objection from defense 
counsel. While many of these questions obviously are preliminary, 
many went directly to critical elements in determining guilt or 
the degree thereof. Further, there are many answers based on hear-
say or conclusions by lay witnesses, again without objection or a 
motion to strike from defense counsel. While as noted the record 
is replete with such questions and answers, the following should 
serve as some typical examples: (Note: Non objectionable question! 
have been included for clarity.) 
1. Direct Examination - William E. Pitt 
Q. Did he appear to you to be able to know 
what he was doing what he had done? 
A. Yes he did. 
Q. Nothing out of the ordinary from a person who 
would be involved in such a circumstance would 
you say? 
A. No I would not say out of the ordinary. (T. 18) 
* * * 
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Q. And did he make any corrections as to the 
typed page and statement? 
A. He made a few corrections in it. 
Q. Now then did he indicate to you at that time 
as to the correction that it was in fact a 
full and complete statement? 
A. Yes he did. 
Q. So if he stated to you now three times 
what had occurred and that had been reduced 
to writing and he has reviewed it and made 
the corrections and then he signed it is that 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. As his statement. (T. 20) 
Redirect Examination - Serge Michael Moore 
Q. Dr. Moore I assume then from that statement 
that also if a person reached to grab a person 
by the neck or grab them with their hand or on 
the throat and then later pressure the other way 
would also fracture the hyoid bone? 
A. Thatfs correct. (T. 34) 
Direct Examination - John C. Woods 
Q. Did you notice in his evaluation at times he 
was somewhat vague about certain things and 
particularly the event that of the murder of 
Miss Pauline Alice Montoya? 
A. Yes I did. 
Q. And how did you account for the vagueness? 
Is that also this hostility directed inward to 
himself? 
A. I think there are several factors yes. I think 
that some of that is the hostility the inter-
jected hostility and I think that other part of 
it are simply his repressing information not being 
able to recall information as well as he might be-
cause of being under stress. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-6-
Now is that repression and that vagueness 
memory is that with knowledge of doing that 
or is that because of neurological or physical 
problem of his? 
I feel that that tends to be on a conscious 
level, yes. 
He's doing it to benefit himself, is that what 
you're saying? 
It tends to benefit him, yes. (T. 39) 
* * * 
You were evaluating him to determine whether 
he had criminal responsibility at the time of 
the act on July the 23rd, 1975. 
Yes sir. 
Now, when you say criminal responsibility, what 
do you mean by that? 
That he knew the nature, and quality, and wrong-
fulness of the act which he committed; and was n 
under an irresistible urge or impulse. 
So what you're saying then is that because of 
the evaluation, and the in depth evaluation of 
Mr. McNicol through this long period of time at 
your institution: you determined that he had the 
capacity to know the right or wrongfulness of 
his act on the 2 3rd, is that correct? 
Yes sir. 
So when he did commit the act that he did agains 
Miss Montoya, you're saying, are you not, that fc 
was responsible, that he knew the nature of this 
act and that it was wrong? 
Yes sir. 
Now, you're talking also about an irresistible 
impulse or urge to do something; you say he was 
not acting under one of those things or that tyj 
of a — 
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No. I did not believe that he was acting under 
an irresistible urge or impulse. There is the 
fact that he had been taking drugs prior to this 
and the question of the voluntary use of drugs 
and with the amphetamine type, and alcohol, we 
did not feel that this, however, entered into th 
issue of criminal responsibility. 
And in fact you found him to be able to detail 
what occurred in rather good detail in spite of 
those types of circumstances, is that not true? 
Yes. 
Now, Dr. Woods, you spoke earlier about periodi-
cally Mr. McNicol will be a pretty good guy but 
then he'll go and explode or become hostile. 
Now, would your determination of those moments 
of explosion, or hostility, moments of anger, 
would they be responsible times and would he 
know what he was doing at those moments? 
Yes. 
He would know the nature of his acts at those 
moments? 
Yes. Yes he did know what he was doing at those 
moments. (T. 43) 
* * * 
Mr. Woods, you have testified on cross examina-
tion that at times the defendant, McNicol, would 
have an aggressive outburst toward others, and 
have a tendency to harm others, is that correct? 
Yes sir. 
I think that was consistent with your earlier 
testimony that you directed inward to himself 
or outward to others. 
Yes sir. 
Now, at the time that he does that, he does that 
with responsibility that is, does he know the 
nature of his acts when he's in those aggressive 
outbursts — 
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A. Yes. 
Q. — so he can control himself? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And he knows whether or not it's right or 
wrong, that act? 
A. Yes sir. (T. 47) 
* * * 
Q. You're saying at times he is capable of love 
and affection and moments when he is capable 
of aggression. 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And at either times whether it's passive or 
aggressive, he does know the nature of his act? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And he knows the wrongfulness or the rightful-
ness? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. So whether or not they're inconsistent with 
love and affection he still does — that is it 
does not make him insane, is that correct? 
A. Yes sir. (T. 48) 
Direct Examination - Van 0. Austin 
Q. You mean that he could have prevented the crime 
that he did if he chose to do so? 
A. He could have conformed his behavior to the 
requirements of the law, yes sir. 
Q. Did you find that he was acting under irresist-
ible impulses of any kind? 
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A. To my impression that he chose not to con-
form his behavior rather than lacked the 
ability to conform it. (T. 51) 
* * * 
Q. And in the event that that did occur, and 
Miss Montoya exerted some kind of force with 
a broom, or with any of her physical self — 
an aggressive outburst on the part of Mr. 
McNicol did in fact occur; would your testi-
mony still be the same that he would be able 
to control that outburst? 
A. It's my impression he would have the ability 
to control the outburst if he chose to. 
Q. But that he would be able to determine that 
of himself, knowing the wrongful nature of 
his act, if he did that? 
A. I think so. 
Cross-examination by defense counsel varies from none 
to cursory to completely re-emphasizing points made by the prose-
cution on direct examination. Examples follow: 
1. Cross-examination William E. Pitt. 
This cross-examination consists of a couple of questions 
soliciting a fact already in evidence that Mr. McNicol did not re-
enter the apartment with the investigating officers since he didn't 
want to see the body. Yet, some of this witness's testimony was 
extremely damaging, e.g. when he testified in relation to a ques-
tion as to what defendant had said, he answered: "He told me that 
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( 
he had strangled his girl friend Alice Montoya to death. He 
said that he had grabbed her from behind like they had taught 
him in the service. He stated they taught him to do it in twelve 
seconds but he done it in ten." (T. 7) 
Obviously, from the foregoing a jury would conclude 
that there was a man trained and experienced and taught to kill 
with his hands in hand to hand combat. The exact words used by 
the defendant could be extremely important to a jury's decision 
in this matter and a searching cross-examination may well have 
revealed that the words were not exactly as stated or that the 
officerfs memory as to the exact words used was faulty, and this 
is particularly true since these words do not appear in defen-
dant's written statement. (Exhibit 2) 
Further the following which incidentally was brought 
out on cross-examination by the prosecution at T. 68: 
"Q. You learned that method of disabling a 
person in the service, did you not? 
A. I did not, it was shown to me." 
would seem to indicate the possibility or even probability that 
defendant, rather than having been skilled and experienced in hand 
to hand combat was merely subjected, probably along with another 
group of bored recruits, to a lecture, demonstration or training 
film on the subject. In any event, the matter was never pursued 
in depth by the defense counsel. 
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2. Cross-examination Dr. Serge Michael Moore. 
After defense counsel had gone in to the subject 
with Dr. Moore of the fragility of the hyoid bone and brought 
out the following: 
" ... only it fractures and there is 
hemorrhage under the layers that cover the 
bone, and swells the bone itself. The hem-
orrhage is also surrounding the tiessues 
that are supporting that hyoid bone in the 
neck." (T. 31) 
and though Dr. Moore had testified that death was due to a 
decreased blood flow to the brain, defense counsel never ex-
ploited the possibility that the swelling above-mentioned could 
result in shutting off such a blood flow. Instead, he re-
emphasized the doctor's testimony that the neck in the crotch 
of the elbow would not fracture said bone by asking the follow-
ing even though defendant's testimony was that he put his arm 
around her neck: 
"Q. I see. All right. Now, going back to your 
statement that as I understand your state-
ment, just the neck in the crotch of the 
elbow (indicating) of itself would not pro-
duce a fracture that we are talking about? 
A. No. That in itself no. It had to be direct 
pressure of either the hand or fingers to the 
wing of the bone that I have mentioned." 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
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3. Cross-examination of John C. Woods. 
Again, cross-examination merely emphasizes and 
strengthens the prosecution's case: 
"Q. Doctor, in your examination of the defendant, 
did you determine whether or not at the time 
of the act the defendant had extreme hostility 
or hatred toward the victim? 
A. I would say yeah, in my opinion, yes, he did, 
Q. In your opinion, do you think that that was 
present in this instant? 
A. Do I think that he was aggressive? Yes. I do. 
(T. 44, 45) 
* * * 
Q. Yes. Now, would you say that this explosive 
behavior of the moment of the situation we're 
talking about was the result of sudden passion 
or quarrel? 
A. It probably had something to do with — most 
likely had something to do with an ongoing 
quarrel; but I do not feel that it was explo-
sive. There is a difference between an aggres-
sive outburst and an uncontrolled, explosive 
outburst. 
Q* Are you saying then that in this instance there 
was not an explosive outburst of behavior? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Well, on a sudden, did you say — what did you 
say then as to the exhibit of passive aggressive 
tendency when a person wants to punish himself? 
A. That there will be aggressive outbursts. 
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Q. Aggressive outbursts? 
A. That's different than explosive. 
Q. Okay. Would you explain? 
A, Aggressive outbursts have — there is more 
ability to control oneself if one chooses to; 
an explosive outburst gives the connotation 
that a person does not have that ability to 
control themselves; and it is my opinion that 
Mr. McNicol had the ability to control himself 
if he had chosen to." (T. 46-47) 
4. Cross-examination Dr. Van 0. Austin: 
During the cross-examination of Dr. Austin the following 
occurred: 
,fQ. Dr. Austin, you examined in these interviews, 
the defendant quite thoroughly, did you not? 
A. As thoroughly as I thought it was possible. 
Q. Yes. Did he tell you in detail what happened? 
A. He told me most of the details of the crime 
which apparently happened. 
Q. Could you repeat those details? 
A. Is it our job to investigate? 
THE COURT: Mr. Young, generally this is not done 
and it's coming from you as a defense; and the doctor 
is hesitant to do that. He has some responsibility to 
Mr. McNicol as in the circumstances under which the 
examination was conducted." 
After the Court interrupted the doctor as he started to answer, 
the prosecutor interposed an objection on the grounds that he 
didn't think it was the purpose of the doctor to find out the de-
tails of the crime, which objection was sustained. (T. 51-52) 
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What defense counselfs purpose was for this inquiry 
is not known and it would appear that the Court was attempting 
to protect the defendant. However, if there was a purpose in 
pursuing the matter, we will never know from this record, since 
after the objection was sustained, 
"Q. (By Mr. Young) Did you determine, doctor — well, 
strike that, no more questions." (T. 52) 
which ended the inquiry. 
5. Recross-examination Dr. Van 0. Austin: 
On recross-examination defendant's counsel further 
emphasized the prosecution's case: 
11Q. Yes. And do you state that he was not acting 
at the particular time under any irresistible 
impulse? 
A. That's right, sir. 
Q. And that he knew the nature of his acts? 
A, That's right, sir. 
Q. Are you saying then that in your opinion he 
intended to do her harm? 
A. I can say that he had the capacity to form 
the intent to do her harm. 
Q. But do you — 
A. I cannot or I say I cannot say whether or not he 
had the intent to do her harm, that is not my job 
to get that. 
Q. Yes. He had the capacity to'. 
A. To form the intent." 
( 
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6. Cross-examination of Allan James - none. 
The direct examination of the defendant McNicol covers 
a total of four pages of the transcript, T. 62 through T. 65. Not 
including preliminary questions the prosecutor objected some seven 
times, all of which were sustained by the Court as were motions 
to strike, and it appears that defense counsel either through 
inability to rephrase his questions or a lack of pre-trial prepara-
tion with the defendant failed to adequately probe matters impor-
tant to possible defenses or to counter adverse impressions cre-
ated on cross-examination by a redirect examination of defendant. 
One area in the evidence which may have had a very 
decided effect as to the degree of guilt in the minds of the jury 
may have been the completely unexplained failure of defendant on 
discovering that Miss Montoya was dead to go for help and/or 
report same and they very well may have taken such conduct as an 
indication of a "depraved indifference to human life." Yet, there 
are indications in the record at T. 39 of a vagueness of memory 
as to the details of the occurrence and further reference to am-
nesia (Ex. 18) which might well be a clue to a possible explanation 
as to why the defendant did what he did and failed to report the 
matter until the following evening. In any-event, from this record 
it can only be concluded that the matter was not pursued and no 
attempt was ever made to explain this unusual conduct. 
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An area which might have borne some fruit if probed 
was a reference to the use of drugs and/or alcohol by the de-
fendant in the testimony of Dr. Woods (T. 42-43). However, the 
matter was never explored by the defense either in presenting 
its case or in cross-examination of the witness. 
Another area which was not explored on cross-examina-
tion of doctors Woods and Austin was the question of the degree 
of their qualification, although from their testimony would ap-
pear that neither was a qualified psychiatrist but only held an 
M.D. degree. (T. 35 and T. 49) 
Admission of Exhibits. 
The prosecution introduced 20 Exhibits in this trial, 
none of which were objected to by defense counsel. While none 
appear particularly prejudicial, several could be objected to on 
technical grounds and lack of such objections serve to further 
illustrate counsel's conduct of the defense. 
Jury Instructions. 
As far as can be determined from a review of the record 
and transcript, defense counsel submitted no requested jury in-
structions nor did he take exception to any of those given. Yet, 
an examination of Instruction No. 11 (R. 65) indicates it fails 
to inform the jury that if the evidence has" not established one 
or more of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt the 
are then to proceed to consider the lesser included offenses. 
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While an examination of all of the instructions as 
to lesser included offenses and the verdict form furnished may 
have sufficiently informed the jury to this effect, it still re-
mains a possibility that one or more of the jurors could have 
been confused and believe that they either must convict the 
defendant of criminal homicide, murder in the second degree, or 
acquit him because of this omission. 
Further, exception could have been taken to Instructions 
11 and 12 on the grounds that Instructions 11 and 12 are confusing 
in that they fail to adequately differentiate between the reckless 
conduct required for conviction of the different included offenses, 
CONCLUSION 
This short transcript in a second degree murder trial 
is so replete with errors, omissions and the failure to pursue 
possible defenses that even though any one of these matters in 
and of itself might not be serious enough to require a reversal, 
the entire picture presented was one of a completely inadequate 
defense. 
As was said in the case of U.S. v. Merrit, 528 Fed. 2d 
650, C.A. 7 1976, in reversing a case for ineffective assistance 
of counsel: 
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 The cumulative effect of several incidents 
provide reasonable grounds for questioning coun-
sel's professional judgment and skill though stand-
ing alone none would lead to the conclusion that 
counsel had not met a minimum standard of profes-
sional representation." 
Actually, to obtain a comprehensive feeling for 
the inadequacies of representation, it is respectfully requested 
that the members of the Court read this transcript in its entirety 
which in view of its brevity should not unduly impose on the time 
of any member of the Court. 
Based on the foregoing, it is requested that the con-
viction be set aside and defendant granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SUMNER J. HATCH and 
L. E. RICHARDSON -
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed two copies of the 
foregoing Brief to Vernon B. Romney, Attorney General of Utah, 
Utah State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this / 7 ^ a y 
of May, 1976. 
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